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Summary: This paper develops a better understanding of what may be understood as a barrier to 
climate friendly investment and suggests to tool that could be used in appropriate 
policy design. In addition to an overview of the broader conceptual definitions of a 
barrier, the paper develops a definition of a barrier to adaptation and mitigation 
investment according to economic mechanisms that lead to the decreased 
attractiveness of the investment (relative to the hypothetical case of functioning 
markets) leading to the market imperfections as well as the impact on the risk and 
return profile. This illustrates that in general barriers may be addressed to correct the 
market imperfection or compensating the investor. The decomposition of the barriers 
along the market imperfection and investor’s perception enable to suggests a tool to 
suggest the design for the require policy change.  
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1. Introduction 
The science of climate change is working on global-scale climate to analyses the trade-off between 
mitigation costs, on the one hand, and adaptation costs and residual damages on the other.
1
 Substantial 
emissions reductions over the next few decades can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and 
beyond, increase prospects for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in 
the longer term and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development. At the Paris 
climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally 
binding global climate deal. The agreement sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to 
avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C.  
Reducing emissions is the main objective, as past and future emissions of GHGs will cause further 
warming and ongoing changes in all components of the climate system. From an economic point of 
view a carbon price would be an adequate instrument to internalize this emission externality. The real 
world, however, is more complex and faced with a multicriteria optimisation problem. Adaptation and 
mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. In 
other words, the less we achieve the emission reduction, the higher the resulting climate impacts and 
required adaptation measure. This corresponds to a trade-off between resources expended on 
mitigation versus adaptation.  
In order to achieve aggressive emission reduction targets, all CO2 emitting sectors have to make 
significant improvements and will have to shift from primary, carbon-containing fuels to electric 
power. This structural change towards low-carbon and climate-resilient development appears to be 
possible, not only technically but also economically, but it requires political will and coordinated 
action to facilitate investments in adaptation and mitigation. Carbon-intensive sectors need to continue 
transitioning their business models to low-carbon and resilient models. This implies a shift of the 
capital stock towards low-carbon emission sectors and/or technologies over time. Given the 
constraints on the availability of public resources, significant private sector financing will be required 
to play a role towards a transformation. Investors providing capital will form expectation about the 
different risks of investment alternatives against the background of a structural change e.g. balance 
risks and return of investment in renewable vs fossil fuel energy. This puts an emphasis on the 
decisions of investment or allocation of capital resources. 
In 2015, a record of $329 billion of new clean energy investment
2
 including $286 billion in new 
renewable energy investments (excl. investments in large hydro of $ 43 billion) has been achieved.
3
 
Fears remain, however, that delivered investment are of insufficient scale as this is much less than the 
required annual average investment of USD 840 billion estimated by the IEA for realizing the 2° 
target.
4
 Understanding the reasons for the lack of investment is essential for identifying desirable 
projects that have not yet taken place.  
                                                     
1 IPPC (2013), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5 th Assessment Report. 
2
 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2016), “Clean energy defies fossil fuel price crash to attract record $329bn global investment in 2015”, 
January 14th 2016, available at: http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/clean-energy-defies-fossil-fuel-price-crash-to-attract-record-329bn-
global-investment-in-2015/ 
3
 Frankfurt School – UNEP/Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2016), Global Trends in renewable Energy finance. 
4
 The IEA estimates that for realizing the 2° target the energy sector has to invest USD 13.5 trillion in energy efficiency and low-carbon 
technologies from 2015 to 2030, an annual average of USD 840 billion. OECD/International Energy Agency (2015), Energy Climate and 
Change - World Energy Outlook Special Report.  
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The literature has consistently demonstrated that many mitigation related projects face obstacles. 
Discussions in the climate community about the type and volume of investment in renewable energy 
and energy efficiency that would be required in order to avoid dangerous levels of anthropogenic 
climate change often refer to “barriers” to investment which need to be “overcome” through policies. 
Common examples for this are the cases in which the level of an investment subsidy is only justified 
by the fact that this subsidy level is needed in order to make the project commercially attractive. From 
an economic perspective this way of “using” of the term barriers increases the risk of inefficient and 
overly costly promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. In some cases a rather broad 
understanding of what constitutes a barrier might be used to justify policy measures in order to 
overcome them. 
A good understanding of barriers is needed for efficient private investment mobilization to support the 
structural change towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient development. The paper develops a 
definition of a barrier to investment in mitigation according to economic mechanisms that lead to the 
decreased attractiveness of the investment (relative to the hypothetical case of functioning markets) 
leading to the market imperfections. The existing investment barriers are decomposed along their 
fundamental relation to a given market imperfection and also indicate their impact on the risk return 
profile of an investor. This illustrates that in general barriers may be addressed through correcting the 
market imperfection or compensating the investor. In doing so, we develop a tool to inform policy 
design targeted at mobilizing commercial climate friendly investment to facilitate the structural 
change. 
2. What is a barrier - definitions across different fields? 
The literature provides an overview of many barriers mitigation related projects face for their 
implementation. This raises the question whether all private sector renewable-related activities which 
are desirable from a societal point of view of a whole economy are implemented. 
The term „barrier“ (synonyms: obstacles, hindrances, impediments, frictions) is used in different 
contexts in finance and economics. The extensive literature on trade barriers in the field of political 
science and economics includes technical barriers to trade “Technical barriers to trade and investment 
are unnecessary obstacles to international trade”5 and reasons for government intervention are amongst 
other aimed at increasing national welfare “[…] to correct market failures and to exploit a country’s or 
a firm’s market power (by manipulating the terms of trade and shifting profits)”. Barriers to capital 
flow in the capital market literature as “factors that constrain the efficient the capital flow movements 
across national boundaries and hinder move to the location with the highest return” where the 
“removal of barriers to trade in capital may improve overall welfare”6 These traditional understandings 
of “barriers” in the literature have in common, that barriers prevent the markets from functioning 
efficiently. 
Over the recent years the term barriers has increasingly been used in relation to climate and 
environment and appears to have adopted versions of a broad and descriptive definition of barriers to 
implementing low-carbon technologies are found to signify factors that “hinder the wished-for 
development”7 or that “operate in between actual and potential RE development”8. Sometimes barriers 
                                                     
5 World Trade Organisation (2012), World Trade Report 2012. 
6 See e.g. Espinosa, Bruce & Yip (2000), “Mezziani (2003), National Institute of Economic & Social Research (2006) and Lal (1998). 
7 Ahlborg and Hammar (2014). 
8 Verbruggen et al. (2013). 
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are considered “anything that [reduces the] implementation of low carbon technologies”9. This 
tendency remains in the understanding of barriers in the (renewable) policy context, where “barriers 
put renewable energy at an economic, regulatory, or institutional disadvantage relative to other forms 
of energy supply”10 Various frictions in the energy sector, government regulations, and financial 
markets may lead to under-investment, the level of investment being lower than the economically 
efficient level. At least for the field of implementing low carbon technologies, however, it appears 
obvious that the term barrier is used rather descriptive as opposed to its normative powers in the trade 
and capital market literature.  
As identifying barriers is frequently used for policy design and sometimes the definitions explicitly 
refer to policies, we argue that a descriptive understanding of the term is not sufficient. Overcoming a 
barrier in this sense might imply more renewable energy and energy efficiency-related investment, but 
might not appropriately reflect the costs to overcome the barrier and whether there are other options to 
improve the market functioning. Furthermore, the common used definitions do not reflect that in 
reality, barriers can prevent socially optimal resource allocation on various level, e.g. at national level 
(macro) and investment (micro) level. For an appropriate policy design, the barriers on the different 
levels need to be assed separately. For instant, the common used definitions around barriers and how 
to overcome them does not help the investors regarding taking his investment decision nor the 
regulator how to design appropriate climate policies to facilitate private sector investments. 
To analyse whether barriers may lead to under-investment – the level of investment being lower than 
the economically efficient level – a better understanding of the term “barrier” in the climate context 
from an economic perspective and its impact on the different stakeholder is needed. Therefore we 
suggest – leaning towards Ekholm et al. (2013) – going back to the original use of the term barriers 
that defining barriers requires at least implicit reference to the social optimum – and adds the 
investor’s perspective: 
“A barrier to investment in renewable energy or energy efficiency is a friction that prevents 
renewable and energy efficiency at a socially optimal level.”  
One simple consequence of such a definition would be: If barriers prevent the social optimum from 
materializing then – obviously – overcoming all barriers means to advance the situation closer to the 
social optimum. The major differences between the way barriers are used in relation to climate and 
environment compared to the traditional understanding is the reference to the social optimum. While 
this reference might appear rather hypothetical in our applied context, it has one major consequence: 
Overcoming a barrier in our sense automatically implies a welfare improvement compared to the 
situation in which all barriers are removed. In other words: anything that qualifies as a barrier under 
this definition deserves to be removed in order to move the situation closer to the social optimum. 
2.1. Renewable energy and energy efficiency barriers in the literature 
There is plenty of reference to renewable energy and energy efficiency investment barriers in the 
literature. Most would acknowledge a broad range of categories and focus on a few specific barrier 
types, while others would cluster and aggregate barriers in typological themes. Although there are 
some overlaps, the five most frequently discussed typological in renewable and are policy, regulation 
& economic, financial market, and institutional barriers within a finance institution, technological 
                                                     
9 Gillingham and Sweeny (2012) Barriers to Implementing Low Carbon Technologies 
10
 Beck, F. and E. Martinot (2004). 
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barriers and psychological and behavioural barriers. Subsequently, Table 1 aggregates the barriers to 
investments renewable energy and energy efficiency as they are discussed in the literature in 
typological themes.
11
 However, two issues are worthwhile to keep in mind: First, other categorisations 
than the one we have used here are equally possible. Second, most barriers are not limited to 
investments in RE/EE but may exist for other types of investments as well. Therefore, the last column 
indicates if the literature mentions this barrier in the context of RE, EE or as general barrier to 
infrastructure investment (GE).  
                                                     
11 The table is based on the following sources: Source: Black (1974), Eun & Janakiramanan (1986), Rodrik (1991), Sutherland (1991), De 
Canio (1998), Martinot (1998), Tamirisa (1999), Aherne, Griever & Warnock (2000), Painuly (2001), Banz & Clough(2002), Mezziani 
(2003), Beck & Martinot (2004), Mackin (2006), Margolis. & Zuboy (2006), National Institute of Economic & Social Research (2006), 
Azzimonti & Sarte (2007), Blynth et al. (2007), EIB, (2007), EIB, (2007b), Fischer (2008), Sardianou (2008), Schleich & Gruber (2008), 
Mirza (2009), Sovacool (2009), Cagno et al. (2010), Crotti, Cavol & Wilson (2010), Deutsche Bank (DB) Climate Change Advisory Services 
(2010), Verbruggen (2010), del Rio (2011), Kolev et al. (2012), Kotsios (2010), West (2010), IFC (2011), Ohls & Moslener (2011), EIB 
(2012b), Richards (2012), Richards & Noble (2012), Martin & Rice (2012), Masini (2012), UNEP FI (2012), Micheli et al. (2012), Leete 
(2013), Leete & Xu (2013), del Rio (2011), Byrnes et al. (2013), CPI (2013g), EIB (2013a), Kostka et al. (2013), Masini (2013),UNDP 
(2013), The World Bank Group (2013), Xuegong et al.(2013), Venmans (2014), Jones (2015). A more detailed table is provided in the 
Annex. For a literature review about barriers in adaptation see Connell, R., Druce, L., Grüning, C., Pauw, P. and U. Moslener (2016), 
Demystifying private adaptation finance, working paper, forthcoming. 
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Table 1: Barriers to renewable energy and energy efficiency investment in the Literature 


































Policy, Regulatory & 
Economic barriers are typically 
either created by or result from 
a lack of government action. 
Policy and regulatory barriers 
include laws and regulations as 
well as the state policy. 
Lack of regulatory structure/factors e.g. no independent regulatory authority, non-transparent or inconsistent guidelines and regulatory principles RE, EE, GE 
Grid access and integration risk (e.g. existence of state-run monopolies of energy supplier and/or distributor, controlled transmission and distribution; lack of grid policies, long- term contracts between 
the government and the established market actors) 
RE, GE 
Lack of public infrastructure (e.g. lack of institutional coordination and cooperation within and between various ministries, agencies, institutes and other; knowledge gap of governmental institution; 
inadequately equipped governmental agency) 
RE, EE, GE 
Lack of coherent policies to promote RE/EE (e.g. uncertainty in policies, red tape, lack of policies to provide incentive to invest in RET like missing climate change strategy; explicit goals for RE/EE). RE, EE 
Fiscal barriers e.g. subsidies for conventional energy, tariff and non-tariff barriers on import/export of RETs. RE, EE 
Discriminatory Taxation e.g. foreign investors are more heavily taxed than domestic investors. GE 
Lack of political stability e.g. corruption., balance of payment problems, uncertain economic growth, Expropriation of Assets (The government of the country where  funds  are invested confiscates the 
capital investment), Repatriation of profits (e.g. investors are unable  to convert  earnings into dollars for the repatriation of pro fit because se of the host government's  rigid currency rules) 
RE, EE, GE 
Foreign Exchange Risk; High inflation rate 
Government procurement  
Intellectual property rights 
























All the limitations that reduce 
the range of financial contracts 
that agents can sign and/or that 
prevent them to be honoured 
appropriate. 
Imperfect capital market (e.g. under-developed capital markets, restricted entry to capital markets) and Insufficient liquidity of financial markets RE, EE, GE 
Capital controls significantly reduce exports into developing and transition economies and not into industrial countries. GE 
Liquidity Risk (e.g. in a shallow overseas market with insufficient demand, attempts to liquidate assets on a large scale reduce the market value of the assets) and managing liquidity issues e.g. 
Limitations on investing in illiquid assets 
RE, EE; GEI 


















 General shortcomings in 
institutional arrangements and 
governance. Institutional 
competition, layered 
bureaucracy and entrenched 
rules can limit organizations’ 
ability to change behaviour. 
High initial capital costs/investments for RE projects RE, EE, GE 
Lack of appropriate financial products and lending policies e.g. mismatch of the economic lifetime of many clean energy projects and bank’s expectation and ability regarding the loan maturity  RE, EE, GE 
Lack of strategy, operational procedures and management of an financial institution or projects/programmes (e.g. missing sustainability aspects in the vision, strategy and business plans, lack of 
resource knowledge combining financial and technical expertise, lack of loan cycle and risk management, lack of standardized energy audits) 
RE, EE 
Limited availability of appropriate public-private partnerships RE; EE 
Diversification and limiting exposure to an industry or investment theme: Sector limits required to manage overall portfolio risk RE, EE, GE 





















Technological barriers usually 
refer to the lack of advanced 
technologies, tools and 
structures related to scale up 
deployment of RE/EE 
technologies 
Maturity level of the RES technologies RE, EE 
Restricted access to RE technology (e.g.  technology, equipment for construction and replacement is imported) RE, EE 
Positive technological externality not internalized (e.g. Technology innovators are not guaranteed a share of the profits, while investment is capital intensive and design decisions are difficult to reverse) Re, EE 
Environmental and social aspects e.g. water requirements for biomass production, local pollution like. noise, visual impact in the case of wind energy, resettlement of village for dams  RE 
Lack of compatibility of RES components with existing infrastructure e.g. lack of transmission infrastructure, low reliability of electricity grids (e.g. non-availability of physical infrastructure, and 
transmission and distribution networks in potential sites of renewable energy) 
RE 
Lack of skills for operation and maintenance at the project site RE 
High transaction costs independent of the project size e.g. the outlay in time and money to obtain agreements, get approvals, make decisions, arrange financing, select site and other similar activities 
required to move a project from idea to reality.  
RE, EE, GE 
Lack of standards for renewable energy products RE, EE 
Knowledge gap of end-users, developers and utilities 
Lack of awareness and information (e.g. lack of climate change risk and data, lack of technical skills and experience to identify risks and opportunities of cleaner technology and sustainable energy 
systems like access to energy, energy security). 
RE, EE 



































Psychological and behavioural 
barriers include factors which 
influence the actor’s decision 
e.g. like social, behavioural 
and cultural factors. 
Social, behavioural and cultural factors (e.g. Lack of consumer acceptance towards RET products) RE, EE 
Technology prejudice/negative risk perception associated with RE/EE projects  RE, EE 
Language barriers: investors can find it particularly difficult to conduct business in a market that uses a language with which they are unfamiliar. GE 
Lack of information and uniform accounting rules e.g. lack of availability and dependability of comparable information on individual companies and industries. GE 
Information asymmetry e.g. inadequate disclosure of economic and financial data as for those considering investing in foreign markets  GE 
Principal-Agent Problem (e.g. If the energy performance of equipment installed by a subcontractor is unobservable or difficult to enforce legally, this creates an incentive for the subcontractor to build 
cheaper equipment with poorer energy performance) 
EE 
                                                     
12
 RE= Renewable Energy; EE = Energy efficiency and GE=general barrier to investments 
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2.2. Decomposition of the Barriers: Barriers, Market Imperfections and the Risk-Return 
Profile 
It is obvious from a first look that those barriers mentioned in the renewable energy and energy 
efficiency as they are used and formulated are a heterogeneous mix of normative and descriptive 
definitions and reflect the investor and economic perspective. The liquidity risk (e.g. in a shallow 
overseas market with insufficient demand, attempts to liquidate assets on a large scale reduce the 
market value of the assets) and managing liquidity issues (e.g. limitations on investing in illiquid 
assets) reflect the investor perspective, while positive technological externality which are not 
internalized (e.g. Technology innovators are not guaranteed a share of the profits, while investment is 
capital intensive and design decisions are difficult to reverse) others refer to deeper market mechanics 
or market imperfections directly.  
After having established our definition, anything that qualifies as a barrier under this definition 
deserves to be removed in order to move the situation closer to the social optimum. Therefore, the 
barriers to renewable energy and energy efficiency investment already mentioned in the literature will 
be filtered with respect to the two questions: i) Economic perspective: What is the underlying market 
imperfection of the observable “barrier”? And ii) Investor perspective: What is the consequence for 
risk and/or return of the corresponding investment for the investor? 
Economic perspective 
Ekholm et al. (2013) state that “In an ideal environment in which markets are complete13 and 
competitive, all positive and negative externalities are priced,
14
 and no information asymmetry exists,
15
 
investments will be at a socially optimal level.” This directly implies that market imperfection results 
where markets, are not able to deliver the most efficient allocation of resources (not welfare 
maximizing/optimal to society. The absence of any precise typological groupings in the literature the 
market imperfections are classified in: emission externalities, technological spill-over, imperfect 
financial market, asymmetric information and other potential unjustified market distortions.  
In a simplified way, externality exist as soon as the maximization of the own utility has a 
uncompensated positive or negative impact on the utility on another actor. Typically, for RE/EE 
investments externalities result through emission externalities and technology spill-over. Emission 
externalities refer to negative or positive uncompensated effect of economic activity on an uninvolved 
party. These external effects are not included in the economic calculations of market agents. Emission 
externalities include all negative external effects of economic activity on the environment, including 
e.g. pollution in the form of carbon emissions or abatement activities. Technology spill-over describes 
a positive externality that is not reflected in the economic calculations of agents. Technology spill-
over – such as Research and Development or the deployment of new technologies – generates 
knowledge that is publicly available, if the idea or development cannot be (patent-) protected. 
Imperfect financial markets do not allocate capital such that it is used most productively from a social 
                                                     
13
 Market completeness means that there are traded contracts for every possible contingency in future and there is a price for them. This 
allows having a unique price for any risky production technology. Obviously, reality is far from this assumption. 
14 Externalities exist when the negative or positive effects of an activity affects other agents in the economy without being reflected in its 
private price. As an example of positive externality, one can refer to climate effects of renewable technologies. If positive externalities are 
not included in the price, agents will under-invest in that technology. 
15
 There are two main types of informational asymmetries in the financing practice. Adverse-selection refers to a situation in which a 
financier cannot distinguish between high quality and low quality investment projects. Moral- hazard happens when the entrepreneurs who 
has received some external financing behaves in a way to maximize her benefits and not necessarily the benefits of the financier. In 
aggregate level, both types results in lower provision of funds to investment projects. 
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point of view.
16
 Three types of capital market imperfections that typically occur in relation to RE/EE 
financing decisions are (i) the lack of a (liquid) market for long-term debt, as many RE/EE 
investments face substantial payback periods due to their lifetime. This is an issue for larger scale 
infrastructure, (ii) imperfect credit markets, and (iii) the monitoring externalities.
17
 For instance known 
technologies will find financing more easily compared to relatively new ones even if they are tested, 
just not yet established. On top of this, (iii) all risks that are impossible to insure like the exploration 
risk for geothermal projects are also some form of capital market imperfection. Information 
asymmetry need to be distinguished between i) actors using the asymmetric information strategically, 
and ii) if some market actors have simply access to more information than others for decisions in 
transactions. The perhaps most famous example for using asymmetric information strategically is 
illustrated George Akerlof’s (1970) analysis of the market for lemons.18 Similarly, all cases of the 
principal-agent problems for energy efficiency investment are an example for strategic use of 
asymmetric information. Capital market imperfection is often one consequence of such asymmetric 
information. If commercial banks are not familiar with RE/EE projects due to lack of information then 
this may lead to inefficient credit decisions. Market distortions on other markets subsume all factors 




Barriers may lead to under-investment – the level of investment being lower than the economically 
efficient level. Investors make their investment and financing decisions based on their expectations 
about the future, subject to the usual business risks (e.g. development, construction, operation risks).
19
 
As investments generally take place where the risks are balanced by projected return these are crucial 
decision factor from the investor’s perspective for any investment finance decision as well as other 
institutional issues like investment practices of institutions or traditional restricted investment and 
lending policies that hinder the investor from the investment (path dependency). The return category is 
differentiated in barriers reducing the return of RE/EE projects, barriers that provide fossil fuel 
projects a comparative advantage (but do not actually reduce the return of the RE/EE) and finally 
barriers that reduce the return of foreign investors compared to national once. For all type of 
investment, the investors face various risks. It represents only a barrier in case the investor can’t hedge 
or avoid the risk through contracts. The higher the (perceived) risks are, the higher the expectations of 
the investor on the return will be. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that risks can be 
perceived differently on the macro-level than from the investor’s perspective, depending on their 
ability to influence the risk. Each investor, however, has not only an individual risk perception, but as 
well an individual risk-return profile which is acceptable for him. The high (perceived) risk can burden 
the financial viability of projects. To attract private sector investments, RE/EE projects need to 
provide an at least equally attractive risk-return profile– from their perspective. 
Based on our definition the barriers in Table 1 are filtered and characterised in terms of the economic 
mechanisms that lead to the decreased attractiveness of the investment (relative to the hypothetical 
                                                     
16
 J. E. Stieglitz (1974). 
17
 Ohl, U. and U. Moslener (2011). 
18
 Akerlof, G. A. 1970. 
19
 See Pauw (2014) for direct or indirect risks to daily business activities or reduced (potential) returns for investment in changing climate  
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case of functioning markets) as well as the impact on the risk and return profile, while keeping the 
classification for barriers in RE/EE, barriers for infrastructure which exist similarly for infrastructure 
investments in general and barriers which are characteristic for all kind of infrastructure investments in 
new technologies. 
Decomposing the fiscal barriers illustrates that all examples previously mentioned like subsidies for 
conventional energy, tariff and non-tariff barriers on import/export of RET or lack of CO2 price 
represent limits to reach the social optimum. From an investor’s point of view, however, they 
represent different obstacles. Subsidies for conventional energy do not reduce the return of a RE/EE 
project but put them in a comparative disadvantage compared to conventional energy. The market 
distortion is from the RE/EE market point of view not justified and occurs on the market for 
conventional energy. The lack of CO2 price reduces the return of RE/EE compared to conventional 
energy as well. The underlying reason, however, is the missing internalization of the emissions 
(emission externality). Tariff and non-tariff barriers on import and export reduce the return from 
increasing costs but this distortion on a different market is of general nature of all imports and export.  
Another example is the grid access and integration risk which corresponds for investors to the volume 
risk whether the power can be sold or not. The volume risk exists as well for other infrastructure 
projects and goes hand-in-hand with an illiquid electricity market which is a sub-optimal situation.  
Following our definition several obstacles mentioned in the literature are not classified as a barrier 
according to our definition. Transactions costs, for example, represent true costs which reduce the 
return of a project RE/EE and may therefore affect the financial and economic viability of the project. 
However, when a RE/EE project is “too expensive”, it is not social optimal to implement it. Another 
example is environmental and social aspects of RE/EE which are actually no barrier to RE/EE 
infrastructure investment. In contrary, these are negative externalities from RE/EE projects which are 
not internalized in the investment decision and put them in a comparative advantage compared to 
infrastructure project in convention. Table 2 provides a synthesis and decomposition of all barriers that 
are identified in the literature and satisfy our definition of a barrier. 
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Reduced relative return of RE/EE 
compared to fossil fuel  
no internalisation of 
emissions due to missing 
CO2 price 
   Comparable disadvantage for RE/EE due to 
fossil fuel subsidies 
Reduced returns of RE/EE  Lower (but rising) maturity of RE/EE 
technology; Technology specific 
learning curve 
increased capital cost (e.g. higher 
interest due to lack of access to 
the capital market) 
Principal-Agent Problem: different 
interests/information level of Principal 
and Agent 
Import taxes/quotas 
Principal-Agent Problem (investor might have 
reduced benefit of EE investments) 
Reduced return for foreign 
compared to national investors 





Volume risk e.g. can the product 
like power or service be sold 
    Illiquid electricity market: Long-term contract, 
state monopoly, grid connection; controlled 
transmission and distribution; lack of 
purchase-power agreements 
Network externality: Inappropriate grid 
infrastructure 
Regulatory and policy risk    Non-transparent guidelines 
unpredictable decision process for the 
permission 
Special interest driven decision making, 
corruption 
legal risk   Expropriation of assets 
repatriation of profits 
  
Currency risk    Illiquid foreign exchange market   
Inflation risk    No hedging against inflations   
Liquidity risk e.g. exit risk   lack of liquid asset market   
Increased planning & operational 
risk due to lack of experience in 
a new environment 
 Lower than expected output or higher 
than expected operating expenses 
shorter than planned lifetime of 
equipment  
(learning about the technology, 
operation and maintenance) 
















Different levels of lack of 
information (of the investor) 
   Lack of knowledge combining financial 
and economic expertise 
lack of uniform accounting rules 
 
Traditionally restricted lending 
and investment policies 
  Restriction to lending for 
collaterals 
  
Traditional indices (low share of 
RE/EE) used as investment 
“benchmark” 
  Distorted price signal   
Investment practices of 
institutional investors 
  Minimum and scale issues of 
institutional investors 
  
Legend: green = RE/EE specific barriers; grey = Barriers for new technologies; without colour = Barriers for all infrastructure investments 
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It is obvious from a first look that the majority of the barriers are of general nature for all infrastructure 
investments. This includes reduced return for foreign compared to national investors or currency risk 
or liquidity risk like the exit risk. Moreover, RE/EE investments face additional barriers typical for 
new technologies in general, e.g. lower (but rising) maturity of technology or increased planning & 
operational risk due to lack of experience. Finally, there are also barriers which are specific to RE/EE 
investments like reduced relative return of RE/EE compared to fossil fuel due to a lack of CO2 price 
or fossil fuel subsidies or traditional indices (low share of RE/EE) used as investment “benchmark”.  
As a consequence, barriers for RE/EE infrastructure investment tend to be more complex, i.e. 
composed of more “elementary barriers”. Shifting private investments towards low-carbon emissions 
therefore requires addressing a variety of barriers but and not only reducing the RE/EE specific 
barriers. 
3. Policy implication 
The barriers analyzed above correspond to factors limiting investments in RE/EE which are rational 
given the private sectors’ circumstances. Given certain circumstances or the manner in which certain 
private actors operate, due to these barriers it may be rational for them not to invest as long the barriers 
exist. One consequence of our definition is that if barriers prevent the social optimum from 
materializing then – obviously – overcoming all barriers means to advance the situation closer to the 
social optimum. Decomposing the barriers according to the economic and investor perspective 
provides a better understanding of the complexity of the existing market imperfections for RE/EE 
investments and their implication for the investor.  
Table 2 can server as starting point to map the status quo and to design policy. A policy maker could 
go through the lines of the table one by one and identify the barriers according to the investment 
environment in his country or for a given sector or technology. This mapping can then be linked to the 
debate about which policy actions can be implemented to get to the “efficient” situation. Basically, 
there exist two approaches (see 
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Figure 1):  
i) correcting the market failure: by altering market institutions or regulation e.g. through 
markets based or command and control instruments. Potential policy instruments are 
different kind of emission standards, emission taxes and tradable emission permits. 
ii) compensating the investor for the impact of the barrier: without correcting the market 
imperfection e.g. through monetary compensation or risk mitigation measures. For 
example, grants and subsidized loans increase the return; and guarantees improve risk 
profiles, or feed-in tariff reduce the output risk of utilities. While the strategy of 
compensation has less structural implications on the market imperfection, it might use the 
fact that, e.g., return impacts are typically additive. 
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Figure 1: Investors and the economic perspective on barriers 
 
 
A comment seems appropriate regarding the potential use of this approach of this so far rather 
theoretical concept. Although based on fundamental economic principles related to efficiency, the 
results are not meant to serve as fundamentalist principles to prescribe policy interventions to remove 
the barriers. This study argues not for aiming to strictly try to remove all market imperfections and to 
leave it all to the market. In fact, that would neither be politically, nor practically possible. Often it 
will be difficult to quantify the market imperfections. Furthermore, the real world, however, is faced 
with a multicriteria optimization problem, as adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies 
for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. The analysis is rather meant to provide some 
kind of a compass with respect to one among many dimensions of policy design. 
The focus on market imperfections is meant to provide orientation with respect to a costs-minimal use 
of public instruments and funds with respect to facilitating a structural change towards a low-carbon 
economy. It is more than simply looking at how to mobilise large investments with a small public 
budget in the sense that it includes the change perspective. However, at the same time it is limited to 
the costs-minimising perspective in the sense that it is blind to distributional effects. Nevertheless, this 
paper argues that the focus on barriers related to market imperfection is helpful in a secondary priority 
sense, namely when it comes to the question, which type of support/distribution instrument will have 
which effect on the structural change. For distributional reason refining policy targets related to 
compensation and fairness are important, but these policies should be designed in a transparent and 
explicit manner, and realizing the potential risk of slowing down or delaying the structural change. 
Even if the barriers are simply used to provide orientation for a cost efficient structural change, the 
mapping to risk and return from the investment perspective provides guidance on whether the public 
actor should subsidise or rather take risk and perhaps how to formulate the eligibility criteria which 
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4. Conclusions 
In order to achieve aggressive emission reduction targets to achieve the 2° target, all CO2 emitting 
sectors have to make significant improvements and will have to shift from primary, carbon-
containing fuels to electric power. Consequently, capital stock has over time to shift towards low-
carbon investments, which puts an emphasis on the investment decision and/or allocation of capital. 
Understanding the reasons for the lack of climate friendly investment not only from the economic 
perspective but as well from the investors’ perspective is essential for identifying desirable projects 
that have not yet taken place.  
The barriers mentioned in the literature are a heterogeneous mix of normative and descriptive 
definitions and sometimes reflect the investor perspective, but sometimes refer to deeper market 
mechanics or market imperfections directly. Defining barriers with a reference to the social optimum 
aims to provide some kind of a compass with respect to one among many dimensions of policy 
design.
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Annex - Table 3: Barriers to renewable energy and energy efficiency investment in the Literature 


































Lack of regulatory structure/factors e.g. no independent regulatory 
authority, non-transparent or inconsistent guidelines and regulatory 
principles 
Rodrik (1991), Painuly (2001), Fischer (2008), Mirza (2009), Ohls & Moslener (2011), 
IFC (2011), Richards (2012), EIB (2012b), Martin & Rice (2012), Xuegong et al. 
(2013), Leete (2013), del Rio (2011), Xuegong et al.(2013), EIB (2013a), Jones (2015) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Grid access and integration risk (e.g. existence of state-run 
monopolies of energy supplier and/or distributor, controlled 
transmission and distribution; lack of grid policies, long- term 
contracts between the government and the established market actors) 
Painuly (2001), IFC (2011), del Rio (2011), Martin & Rice (2012), EIB (2012b),UNDP 
(2013), Byrnes et al. (2013), Xuegong et al. (2013) 
RE, GEI 
Lack of public infrastructure (e.g. lack of institutional coordination 
and cooperation within and between various ministries, agencies, 
institutes and other; knowledge gap of governmental institution; 
inadequately equipped governmental agency) 
Sutherland (1991), Martinot (1998), Painuly (2001), Mirza (2009), Martin & Rice 
(2012), EIB (2013a) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Lack of coherent policies to promote RE/EE (e.g. uncertainty in 
policies, red tape, lack of policies to provide incentive to invest in 
RET like missing climate change strategy; explicit goals for RE or 
EE). 
Painuly (2001), Margolis. & Zuboy (2006), Blynth et al. (2007), Fischer, C., (2008), 
Byrnes et al. (2013),  
RE, EE 
Fiscal barriers e.g. subsidies for conventional energy, tariff and non-
tariff barriers on import/export of RETs. 
Painuly (2001), Mezziani (2003), Beck & Martinot (2004), National Institute of 
Economic & Social Research (2006), Fischer, C., (2008), Mirza (2009), IFC (2011), 
Kostka et al. (2013) 
RE, EE 
Discriminatory Taxation e.g. foreign investors are more heavily 
taxed than domestic investors. 
Black (1974), National Institute of Economic & Social Research (2006) GEI 
Lack of political stability e.g. corruption., balance of payment 
problems, uncertain economic growth, Expropriation of Assets (The 
government of the country where  funds  are invested confiscates the 
capital  investment), Repatriation of profits (e.g. investors are unable  
to convert  earnings into dollars for the repatriation of pro fit because 
se of the host government's  rigid currency rules) 
Painuly (2001), Mezziani (2003), Azzimonti & Sarte (2007), Deutsche Bank (DB) 
Climate Change Advisory Services (2010), IFC (2011), EIB (2013a), Jones (2015) 
RE, EE, GEI 
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 RE= Renewable Energy; EE = Energy efficiency and GEI=general barrier to investments 
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Foreign Exchange Risk 
High inflation rate 
Government procurement  
Intellectual property rights 
Eun & Janakiramanan (1986), Tamirisa (1999), Painuly (2001), National Institute of 
Economic & Social Research (2006), Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisory Services 
(2010) Ohls & Moslener (2011), IFC (2011), Jones (2015) 
 
Kotsios (2010) 
























Imperfect capital market e.g. under-developed capital markets, 
restricted entry to capital markets 
Sutherland (1991), Painuly (2001), Beck & Martinot (2004), EIB, (2007b), Schleich & 
Gruber (2008), EIB (2013a), IFC (2011), Martin & Rice (2012), EIB (2012b), The 
World Bank Group (2013), Xuegong et al. (2013) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Insufficient liquidity of financial markets Sutherland (1991), Painuly (2001), IFC (2011) RE, EE, GEI 
Managing liquidity issues: Limitations on investing in illiquid assets Martinot, (1998), CPI (2013g) RE; EE, GEI 
Capital controls significantly reduce exports into developing and 
transition economies and not into industrial countries. 
Tamirisa (1999), Aherne, Griever & Warnock (2000) GEI 
Liquidity Risk: In a shallow overseas market with insufficient 
demand, attempts to liquidate assets on a large scale reduce the 
market value of the assets. 
Mezziani (2003) RE, EE; GEI 
Transaction costs for the placing order and screening (e.g. custodial 
fees, management fees etc. can be higher for international 
investments).  



















High initial capital costs/investments for RE projects Sutherland (1991), Beck & Martinot (2004), Margolis & Zuboy (2006), Mirza (2009), 
del Río (2011), Martin & Rice (2012), Leete & Xu (2013) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Lack of appropriate financial products and lending policies e.g. 
mismatch of the economic lifetime of many clean energy projects 
and bank’s expectation and ability regarding the loan maturity  
Martinot (1998), EIB, (2007), Mirza (2009), Cagno et al. (2010), IFC (2011), EIB 
(2013a), The World Bank Group, (2013), Jones (2015) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Lack of strategy, operational procedures and management of an 
financial institution or projects/programmes (e.g. missing 
sustainability aspects in the vision, strategy and business plans, lack 
of resource knowledge combining financial and technical expertise, 
lack of loan cycle and risk management, lack of standardized energy 
audits) 
De Canio (1998), Martinot (2001), Beck & Martinot (2004), Sardianou (2008), Kostka et 
al. (2013), Venmans (2014) 
RE, EE 
Limited availability of appropriate public-private partnerships Mackin (2006), UNEP FI (2012) RE; EE 
Diversification and limiting exposure to an industry or investment CPI (2013g) RE, EE, GEI 
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theme: Sector limits required to manage overall portfolio risk 
Investment practices of institutional investors: Practices that affect 
how institutions make investment decisions e.g. require certain 
investment volume 





















Maturity level of the RES technologies Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisory Services (2010), Del Rio (2011), Jones (2015) RE, EE 
Restricted access to RE technology (e.g.  technology, equipment for 
construction and replacement is imported) 
Painuly (2001), Mirza (2009), Martin & Rice (2012) RE, EE 
Positive technological externality not internalized (e.g. Technology 
innovators are not guaranteed a share of the profits, while 
investment is capital intensive and design decisions are difficult to 
reverse) 
Leete (2013) Re, EE 
Environmental and social aspects e.g. water requirements for 
biomass production, local pollution like. noise, visual impact in the 
case of wind energy, resettlement of village for dams  
Painuly (2001), Mirza (2009) RE 
Lack of compatibility of RES components with existing 
infrastructure e.g. lack of transmission infrastructure, low reliability 
of electricity grids (e.g. non-availability of physical infrastructure, 
and transmission and distribution networks in potential sites of 
renewable energy) 
Martinot (1998), Painuly (2001), Mirza (2009) RE 
Lack of skills for operation and maintenance at the project site Martinot (1998), Mirza (2009), Martin & Rice (2012) RE 
High transaction costs independent of the project size e.g. the outlay 
in time and money to obtain agreements, get approvals, make 
decisions, arrange financing, select site and other similar activities 
required to move a project from idea to reality.  
Sutherland (1991), Martinot (1998), Painuly (2001), Beck & Martinot (2004), Margolis 
& Zuboy (2006), Schleich & Gruber (2008), Mirza (2009), Ohls & Moslener (2011), 
EIB, (2007b), Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisory Services (2010), IFC (2011), 
CPI (2013g) 
RE, EE, GEI 
Lack of standards for renewable energy products Painuly (2001), Mirza (2009) RE, EE 
Knowledge gap of end-users, developers and utilities 
Lack of awareness and information (e.g. lack of climate change risk 
and data, lack of technical skills and experience to identify risks and 
opportunities of cleaner technology and sustainable energy systems 
like access to energy, energy security). 
Sutherland (1991), Painuly (2001), Margolis & Zuboy (2006), Schleich & Gruber 
(2008), Sardianou (2008), Mirza (2009), Verbruggen (2010), Richards & Noble (2012), 
Leete (2013), EIB (2012b), Kostka et al. (2013), Venmans (2014) 
RE, EE 
Lack of fuel-price risk assessment Sutherland (1991), Beck & Martinot (2004), Sardianou, (2008), Mirza (2009), Xuegong 
et al. (2013), IFC (2011) 
RE, EE 

































Social, behavioural and cultural factors (e.g. Lack of consumer 
acceptance towards RET products) 
Martinot (1998), Painuly (2001), Margolis. & Zuboy (2006), EIB, (2007), Sovacool 
(2009), Cagno et al. (2010), Verbruggen (2010), Masini (2012), Martin & Rice (2012), 
Kolev et al. (2012), Venmans (2014) 
RE, EE 
Technology prejudice/negative risk perception associated with 
RE/EE projects  
Margolis, & Zuboy (2006), West (2010), Martin & Rice (2012), Leete (2013), Masini 
(2013) 
RE, EE 
Language barriers: investors can find it particularly difficult to 
conduct business in a market that uses a language with which they 
are unfamiliar. 
Mezziani (2003) GEI 
Lack of information and uniform accounting rules e.g. lack of 
availability and dependability of comparable information on 
individual companies and industries. 
Mezziani (2003), Margolis & Zuboy (2006), Micheli et al. (2012) GEI 
Information asymmetry e.g. inadequate disclosure of economic and 
financial data as for those considering investing in foreign markets  
Martinot (1998), Aherne, Griever, & Warnock. (2000), Banz & Clough(2002), EIB, 
(2007), EIB (2012b) Micheli et al. (2012) 
GEI 
Principal-Agent Problem (e.g. If the energy performance of 
equipment installed by a subcontractor is unobservable or difficult to 
enforce legally, this creates an incentive for the subcontractor to 
build cheaper equipment with poorer energy performance) 
Venmans (2014) EE 
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